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Conclusion: the Middle East
After the Arab Spring
Toby Dodge
 “After an evil reign, the fairest dawn is the first.” Cornelius Tacitus, 109. 
“As the fates of previous journées révolutionnaires warn us, spring is the shortest of seasons, 
  especially when the communards fight in the name of a ‘different world’ for which 
they have no real blueprint or even idealized image.” Mike Davis, 2011.
The title of this report, ‘After the Arab Spring: Power Shift in the Middle East?’, deliberately ends with a question mark. The events over the year and a half since the death of Mohamed 
Bouazizi in Tunisia, have left the politics of the Middle East in tumult. The Arab Spring has 
certainly resulted in a change of regime in Tunisia and then Egypt. The uprisings against Gaddafi’s 
regime triggered a military intervention by NATO that drove the Libyan leader and his entourage 
from power. Ali Abdullah Saleh finally relinquished his grip on power in Yemen. However, the 
ramifications of regime change for state-society relations in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya are 
still uncertain. Mubarak may be on trial, Gaddafi is dead and Ben Ali is currently enjoying the 
dubious pleasures of exile in Saudi Arabia. But the ruling elites they created, the state structures 
they built, the powerful secret services and crony capitalists they nurtured did not disappear 
when the despots were deposed. The post-revolutionary transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen 
and Libya are unlikely to deliver on the hopes that united the courageous protestors in their 
struggle. As Ewan Stein argues in this report, ‘the utopian vision of Tahrir was soon tarnished’. 
Across the broader region, beyond Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and Libya, the wave of protests emboldened by 
North African success were driven by similar demographic realities, failures of state policies and demands 
for greater representation. However, they failed to effect regime change. The Arab Spring was a historic 
moment in the politics of the Middle East but its long-term impact remains unpredictable.
George Lawson, in his piece for this report, makes three powerful points about how to best understand 
the ongoing dynamics unleashed by the Arab Spring. The first concedes that ‘very few movements 
lead to successful revolutions’. The region is currently divided between four states in some form 
of post-revolutionary transition and the rest. Although some ruling regimes have faced systematic 
challenges, they have been able to repress the protestors and for the moment at least, contain demands 
for political change. 
Central to the states now entering transition is Lawson’s second point, the comparatively modest 
demands of most contemporary revolutionaries. With the decline in the popular influence of Marxism and 
state-driven agendas for revolutions from above, there has been a shift away from political mobilisation 
designed to push for social transformation. In their place revolutions have become ‘self-limiting’, 
focused on individual liberal political emancipation rather than collective economic transformation. The 
demands for full citizenship, for the recognition of individual political rights, were a powerful unifying 
theme across the Arab revolutions. However, now that four autocrats have been driven from power, 
the crucial questions at the centre of these transitions are as much economic as they are political. 
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How do the new ruling elites set about reorganising 
the economy to meet the unfulfilled aspirations of 
their populations? 
This question is pressing. The ‘authoritarian upgrading’ 
that Steven Hyderman identified as a key strategy 
for regime survival across the Middle East during the 
1980s and 1990s placed limited economic reforms 
at its centre. Using the rhetoric of neoliberalism to 
ingratiate themselves with the United States and the 
international community, Middle Eastern dictators 
sought to jettison the costly developmental promises 
which had once been key to their legitimation. As the 
state retreated from the economy, the indigenous 
bourgeoisie were brought back in; crony capitalists 
became a crucial, if junior member, of the ruling elite. 
This turn to neoliberal justifications for continued rule 
created an influential group of economic entrepreneurs 
who remain dominant in key sections of the Egyptian 
and Tunisian economy. Authoritarian upgrading also 
transformed the barriers between the public and 
the private, the state and the economy. This part-
privatisation of powerful sections of the ruling elite 
became a region-wide phenomenon. However, post-
regime change the legacy of this process is most 
problematic for the political transition in Egypt. For a 
brief but crucial period of time, the Egyptian military 
were celebrated by protestors in Tahrir Square for 
not unleashing their coercive power in support of 
Mubarak’s continued rule. However, this act of 
omission was in part at least motivated by the threat 
the revolution posed to their economic interests. 
Mubarak’s son Gamal was attempting to expand the 
grip of his own group of crony capitalists over the 
economy, thus encroaching on the military’s own 
economic fiefdoms. The Janus-faced relationship that 
Field Marshall Muhammed Hussein Tantawi and the 
Supreme Council of the Armed Forces have had with 
the Tahrir protestors since the removal of Mubarak 
has alternated between celebration and repression 
justified by sinister but hidden foreign conspiracies. 
This political schizophrenia is shaped by the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces’ desire to protect their 
control over up to 40 percent of the Egyptian economy. 
It is essential to understand the role and influence 
of crony capitalists empowered by the old 
regimes because they may act as a counter-
revolutionary force, as has been the case in Egypt. 
A coalition of commercial interests, threatened by 
meaningful economic change could bring together the 
crony capitalists of the old regime with their allies and 
business partners still embedded in the highest ranks of 
the state’s bureaucracy. Alternatively, and more likely, 
as has already happened in Egypt, major indigenous 
economic interests may use their collaborators within 
the state to place clear limits on how transformatory 
the post-revolutionary governments can be. This issue 
will overtly or covertly dominate the path regime 
transition takes, because the shock troops of those 
revolutions, the young people of Egypt and Tunisia, 
were motivated in large part by their own economic 
exclusion. The flagrant corruption of the old ruling 
elite had publicly expanded the chasm between 
the haves and have-nots within society. The post-
revolutionary regimes have not to date shown any 
clear idea, beyond the neoliberal orthodoxy parroted 
by their predecessors, about how they will deliver 
meaningful growth. Mubarak and Ben Ali were 
partially successful in delivering economic growth, 
opening their economies to foreign direct investment 
and multi-national companies. However, the positive 
results of such neoliberal expansion were not felt 
across society. 
The urban poor did not benefit from the infitah 
and the state-employed middle class were directly 
targeted by it. Neoliberal reforms produced a politically 
connected but small nouveau riche, with the majority 
of the population excluded and increasingly resentful. 
The transitional governments need to reformulate 
economic policies in a way that delivers meaningful 
growth to this previously alienated majority. This 
is especially problematic in Egypt, which has 
demographically passed the peak of its youth bulge, 
placing increasing numbers of young people on the job 
market. If the government fails to deliver hope to this 
section of society, there will be the temptation to revert 
to the tried and tested mechanisms of blaming uneven 
economic growth on the vagaries of the market. 
Coercion will then once again become the main tool 
used to demobilise an alienated youth, exposed to but 
excluded from the benefits of transnational capitalism. 
The problems surrounding the delivery of meaningful 
economic growth leads on to Lawson’s third point, 
the lack of ‘contemporary revolutionary ideologies’ 
binding these movements together and the fact that 
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they have ‘... little sense of what an alternative order 
would look like once such processes have taken place’. 
The internationally dominant cliché of an Arab Spring 
revolutionary was a young, network-savvy, college-
educated member of the middle class. As Stein points 
out, the role that Facebook and other new technology 
played in the revolutions was much more complicated 
and inconclusive. The ‘demonstration effect’ which 
drove protest from Tunisia into Libya and Egypt and 
then on into the Gulf was powered by an older form of 
technology, satellite television. Al Jazeera was heralded 
as revolutionary when it launched in 1996. However, 
its long-terms effects may if anything have been more 
influential. Broadly comparable to the Sawat al-Arab 
radio station under Nasser, Al Jazeera and other Arab 
satellite stations played a key role in recreating a 
region-wide Arab public sphere, which amplified the 
demonstration effect of Ben Ali’s departure.
Furthermore, beyond a collective sense of endeavour 
and empowerment, the movements of the Arab Spring 
were not united by a concrete or programmatical 
agenda for post-regime change transformation. The 
results of the Egyptian elections certainly proved that 
Tahrir was not Egypt, but also went on to demonstrate 
that neither was Cairo. The dominance of Islamist 
Parties in the elections, taking 67 percent of the 
vote, came as no surprise. The Muslim Brotherhood 
were able to protect and even foster their nationwide 
organisation under the rule of both Sadat and 
Mubarak. The years of brutal suppression alternating 
with toleration and cooptation turned the Brotherhood 
into a cautious and, given its origins and early ideology, 
a comparatively moderate organisation. The size of its 
presence in parliament and its organisational ability has 
given it the capacity to counter-balance the Egyptian 
military and win early victories in the war of position 
that is now shaping the transition. That said, the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s ‘auto-reform’, its transition 
under state repression from a militant revolutionary 
organisation to one committed to democracy, has 
not given it a clear or insightful programme for the 
transformation of the Egyptian economy in a way 
that can meet the aspirations of its voters or the 
third of Egyptian society aged between 15 and 30. 
There is a danger, as Fatima El-Issawi points out in 
her chapter on Tunisia, that the pressing demands for 
economic transformation will be sidelined and the 
newly empowered but largely inexperienced political 
parties will fight over secondary issues, such as dress 
codes and the policing of morality, which they have 
clear positions on but which of themselves do not 
deliver hope for meaningful change or prosperity.
The final issue surrounding the outcomes of the Arab 
Spring is the coherence of the old ruling elites and their 
ability to suppress or buy off the challenges they faced. 
In two of the four regime changes, the removals of Ben 
Ali and Mubarak were facilitated by the fracturing of 
the ruling elite. In Tunis, Rachid Ammar, the Army Chief 
of Staff refused to open fire on the demonstrators in 
a similar way to Tantawi in Cairo. This left the armed 
forces in both countries intact and in a central position 
to influence the shape of the transition. In Libya, the 
country’s armed forces were overcome through the 
heavy and extended support of NATO. The nature of 
that support led to a fracturing of the state’s security 
forces but this was mirrored by the highly fractured 
nature of the militias fighting to remove Gaddafi. In 
Yemen, whilst the figurehead of the regime has been 
removed, competition for power between tarnished 
former elites dominates the political landscape. 
Without key defections from within the higher 
echelons of the ruling elite or extended external 
military support, the youthful revolutionaries at the 
centre of the Arab Spring have proved unable to 
remove any other ruling elites across the Middle East. 
A year and a half after the start of the Arab Spring, 
successful revolutions have proved comparatively rare, 
even at the centre of what Perry Anderson labelled a 
‘new concatenation of political upheaval’; comparable 
to the Hispanic American wars of liberation that started 
in 1810, the European revolutions of 1848-9 and the 
fall of the Soviet backed regimes in Eastern Europe 
during 1989-91.
Against this background, it is now possible to 
start a discussion about what the aftermath 
of the Arab Spring may look like, what the long 
term effects of this movement could bring. 
As things stand, the Spring has given rise to three 
broad sets of outcomes. The first contains the majority 
of states in the region, and represents little or no 
change. From Saudi Arabia to Jordan, the ruling 
elites have managed through adjustments to their 
ruling strategies to stay in power and face down 
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the protestors. The second category of outcomes 
indicates a more evenly balanced contest between 
those mobilising for change and the regime (or 
remnants of the regime) themselves. This has however 
caused the countries concerned to descend into civil 
war. As things stand both Libya and Syria are in this 
category with Yemen a clear contender to join. Finally, 
there are those countries which are in the midst of 
a largely peaceful transition after regime change, 
Egypt and Tunisia.
The first category of states, those where the regimes 
have survived the challenge of popular protest, 
could be understood as embarking on a new round 
of ‘authoritarian upgrading’. As the Arab Spring 
spread across North Africa and into the wider Middle 
East, ruling elites set about a reassessment of their 
formula for continued rule. This involved adjusting 
the balance between William Quandt’s four pillars of 
authoritarianism, ‘ideology, repression, payoffs, and 
elite solidarity’. In Bahrain, the Al-Khalifa ruling elite 
faced the most serious and sustained challenge to their 
rule in the Gulf region. As Christian Coates-Ulrichsen 
demonstrates in this report, their response was to 
unleash a sustained barrage of repression against those 
involved in the demonstrations. Thus ‘the Bahraini 
government mercilessly pursued all forms of dissent, 
detaining doctors and lawyers merely for treating or 
representing detainees, suspending opposition political 
societies and arresting their leaders’. Once the ruling 
elite’s primacy had been secured, they embarked upon 
a post-facto attempt to downplay, justify and minimise 
the brutal suppression they unleashed. A ‘National 
Dialogue’ was set up but the main opposition parties 
were deliberately under-represented, which begs the 
questions of who is allowed to be a member of the 
nation and what the dialogue was for? The regime then 
set up the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, 
which to the surprise of many, turned out to be both 
independent and an inquiry! The report concluded that 
the authorities had indeed used excessive force and 
torture. It also undermined the ruling elite’s central 
explanation for the protests, finding no evidence of 
Iranian involvement. The aftermath of the protests 
in Bahrain has left the government desperately 
trying to re-establish its international legitimacy but 
continuing to repress the majority of its population. 
The balance of forces within the country, especially 
in the wake of Saudi intervention in support of 
the Al-Khalifas, means the regime itself faces no 
direct threat to its continued rule. However, in the 
aftermath of its extended and brutal crackdown, its 
carefully constructed decade-long attempt to portray 
itself as an open, fairly liberal base for multinational 
companies operating in the region lies in tatters. The 
population has become increasingly divided as the 
regime pandered to sectarian division as part of its 
survival strategy. This has solidified its base amongst 
the minority Sunni section of the population but may 
well constrain the regime’s room for manoeuvre as 
Bahraini society is further partitioned.
The second category of states that have emerged 
from the Arab Spring are those that have descended 
into civil war, Libya and Syria. In the case of Libya, it 
is still not clear whether the highly precarious post-
regime change situation will revert to civil war or 
stabilise into a potentially sustainable transition. The 
fact that Libya today has all the prerequisites of a 
failed state springs from the legacies of Gaddafi’s 
rule, the way regime change was realised, and the 
actions of politicians and militia leaders in its aftermath. 
When he was murdered, Gaddafi bequeathed to 
the Libyan population a malfunctioning state, with 
weak governmental institutions and little or no civil 
society. Still traumatised by the extended quasi-imperial 
occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, the leading 
proponents of military support for regime change in 
Paris, London and later Washington, were determined 
to limit involvement in terms of both ‘boots on the 
ground’ and overt military assistance. The historical 
legacy and the nature of NATO’s actions has left a 
post-Gaddafi Libyan regime with spurious legitimacy 
and little capacity to influence events on the ground. 
Ranj Alaaldin, in this report, quite rightly describes 
the National Transition Council now seeking to run 
Libya as suffering from a ‘series of deficiencies’ a 
‘democratic deficit’ and a number of geographical 
as well as secular-Islamist divisions. To add to the 
country’s current woes, the International Crisis 
Group estimates that real military power lies with 
anything up to 100 militias containing 125,000 armed 
Libyans. This situation of a weak and under-legitimised 
government seeking to impose control over a myriad 
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of militias, fighting to retain their military power and 
geographic autonomy, does not bode well for the 
transition of Libya.
The balance of military forces in Syria, the second 
country in the region to enter civil war during the 
Arab Spring, is not yet as fractured as Libya. Chris 
Phillips details how Syria’s President, Bashar al-Assad, 
systematically undermined the political base that his 
father Hafez had created during his thirty-seven years 
of rule. When faced with the beginnings of political 
discontent at the start of the Arab Spring, the ruling 
elite in Syria divided, with those favouring an all out 
assault on the demonstrators winning. As a result 
the extended military campaign by the Syrian army 
has been against largely urban-based protests across 
the country. The violence meted out by the regime 
quickly forced militarisation on its opponents. Local 
Coordination Committees were formed in dissenting 
communities to try and offer protection to the ongoing 
demonstrations, and consequently Syria descended 
into civil war. However, Phillips correctly designates 
the current situation as a stalemate. The regime is not 
militarily threatened by the revolt. The majority of the 
armed forces have stayed loyal and defections have 
not escalated to a point where the state’s coherence is 
in doubt. However, unlike the last extended revolt the 
regime faced from 1979 to 1982, the regime does not 
have the coercive capacity to suppress the revolt. Its use 
of sectarian ideology has solidified its base amongst 
the Allawite community and fears of radical Islam 
and uncontrolled violence have forced other minority 
communities to offer their begrudging support. 
However, as the violence has continued, it is clear 
that an increasingly large section of the population 
has withdrawn its support or even passive tolerance 
from the regime. That said, the exiled organisation that 
was formed to represent the opposition, the Syrian 
National Council, has failed to establish coherent and 
meaningful links with the revolt within Syria, which 
remains highly localised and fractured. 
Attempts at international mediation have so far failed 
to break this bloody stalemate. With the government 
showing no signs of compromise and the opposition 
largely incoherent, neither able to overthrow the 
regime nor enter into sustained negotiations, 
the temptations for some form of military intervention 
comparable to Libya are increasing. That said, one 
hopes that the lessons of intervention in Iraq, where 
the aftermath of regime change was far more 
murderous than the military action itself, have not 
been completely forgotten. 
The final set of countries to emerge from the Arab 
Spring, those that have moved into what are currently 
peaceful transitions away from dictatorial rule have 
been discussed in detail above. For all the troubles and 
uncertainties surrounding politics in Tunis and Cairo, 
when compared to the violence and instability in Syria 
and Libya and the ongoing post-Spring authoritarian 
upgrading across the rest of the region, Egypt and 
Tunisia continue to offer hope for the populations 
of the Arab world that sclerotic dictators can be 
overthrown and a better freer future is possible 
through political mobilisation. 
The events of the Arab Spring have given hope 
to millions of people across the Middle East and 
beyond that meaningful political change for the 
better is a distinct possibility. That said, of all the 
Arab countries effected by this wave of political 
protest, only two, Egypt and Tunisia, are now 
in what looks like political transitions to a more 
representative form of government. Two more, Syria 
and Libya, were driven into civil war with Yemen 
also showing some signs of following them. The 
rest of the countries of the Middle East retain the 
ruling elites they had before the Arab Spring started. 
Successful revolutions are very rare indeed. ■
